Japan Keeps Monetary Policy Steady

In a unanimous vote, the bank’s board stuck to its strategy of expanding the monetary base at an annual pace of 60 trillion yen to 70 trillion yen, or $586 billion to $684 billion, through purchases of government bonds, commercial debt and other assets.

Haruhiko Kuroda, the bank’s new governor, pledged to “respond flexibly” to the recent moves in Japanese government bond yields, as markets “searched for a new equilibrium.” He stressed that there was no cause for immediate concern.

“Yields are up, but at this stage there is no large impact on the real economy,” Mr. Kuroda said at a news conference after the bank’s decision.

He said that the central bank would continue to make large bond purchases to “keep up the downward pressure on interest rates.” He has also suggested that the bank would adjust the way it bought bonds in the market.

At its first policy meeting under Mr. Kuroda last month, the bank unleashed what analysts have called a “shock and awe” monetary policy, a sea change for a bank that had come to be known in recent years for its caution and conservatism.

Declaring he would do “whatever it takes” to combat falling prices, Mr. Kuroda announced that the bank would seek to double Japan’s monetary base, as well as the bank’s holdings of Japanese government bonds, by the end of 2014.

In recent days, worries have grown about rising interest rates in the government bond market, which could threaten Japan’s monetary policy. Japan is vulnerable to rising borrowing costs because of its high public debt, which is twice the size of its economy. Bonds are also the main financial asset held by banks, pension funds and insurance companies, making a surge in debt yields perilous.

The scale of Japan’s quantitative easing is striking. Assuming that the Japanese economy grows by 2 percent a year, the Bank of Japan would expand its assets to just under 60 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, according to estimates from CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets.

The assets of the Federal Reserve, which now total about 20 percent of the American economy, and the European Central Bank’s assets, which come to about 28 percent of the euro zone’s G.D.P., pale in comparison.

Japan stands out in another important way. Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took office in December and has been the main champion of the bank’s new boldness, Japan is coupling its monetary push with heavy government spending.

Barely two months into office, Mr. Abe pushed through an emergency stimulus package of 10 trillion yen, and the Japanese Parliament is expected to pass an initial budget of 92.6 trillion yen for 2013, with heavy spending on public works.

By contrast, the Fed and the European Central Bank have been forced to depend on monetary policy alone to stave off stagnation and bring about an economic recovery. In both the United States and Europe, a significant increase in government spending remains controversial.

Still, critics have pointed to Japan’s skyrocketing public debt as proof that such spending is not sustainable. The latest spending packages, they say, will be the final push that could send Japan plummeting into a Europe-like debt crisis. Defenders of the bank’s monetary policy had argued that Japan’s bold stimulus efforts would not push interest rates higher, because the central bank promises to buy bonds the government issues.

But in recent days, yields have been volatile, with the key 10-year nominal government bond yield hitting five-year highs last week before later settling down. Traders blamed the central bank’s purchases, saying they created a lack of liquidity in bond markets.

“We think Kuroda has done a great job in boosting asset prices by raising asset price inflation expectation, but he now has to calm down the sentiment in bond market,” Masaaki Kanno, chief economist at JPMorgan Securities Japan, said in a research note. “This is quite challenging.”

Off the Shelf: Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement, Examined in a New Book

Representatives of some 44 nations gathered in July 1944 at Bretton Woods, a resort spot in New Hampshire, to hammer out a world monetary system, replacing the gold standard that had failed so woefully. But only two nations mattered: Britain and the United States.

In “The Battle of Bretton Woods” (Princeton University Press, $29.95), Benn Steil, a senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, describes that effort from its roots and projects its effect on today’s conflicts among the dollar, the euro and the Chinese renminbi. Although America’s global dominance has long since melted away, no substitute is yet strong enough to shove the dollar aside, in part because of Bretton Woods.

Britain entered the conference exhausted and broke, crippled by the war. It desperately needed flexible exchange rates to rekindle its vital exports to pay for the imports it required to live. It clung to a privileged access to trading with its empire, one-fourth of the Earth’s land and people.

America was unscathed at home and far stronger in 1945 than in 1941. Owner of the bulk of the world’s gold bullion, a stunning 20,000 metric tons, the United States wanted to emerge from World War II with fixed conversion rates assured by a dollar tied to gold. And it went without saying that it was bent on becoming the globe’s financial capital.

Representing America at Bretton Woods was Harry Dexter White, an economics professor who had joined the Treasury as an adviser in 1934. By dint of intellect and hard work, he became grudgingly accepted as its ranking expert on international finance. He labored as the brains buttressing the Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, who described himself as “just a farmer,” albeit a close gentleman-farmer friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Morgenthau presided at Bretton Woods but White ran the show.

Dr. Steil presents evidence that White was also an informant for the Soviet Union, a starry-eyed admirer of what he saw as its remarkable economic success. For years, Dr. Steil says, White provided documents to the Soviets and favored their side in policy debates. In 1948, White fended off the House Un-American Activities Committee, denying that he was a Communist. A more adverse light was shed on his activities when wartime codes were broken years after his death. Dr. Steil is more convinced of the espionage claims surrounding White than some historians who see his actions as more innocent. There is no sign that his interest in the Soviets affected his work at Bretton Woods.

Taking Britain’s part at the 1944 conference was the celebrated John Maynard Keynes, who knew full well that war had reduced Britain to a hapless debtor, obliged to accept whatever the United States offered. The book confirms that Keynes was an intellectual giant with flawless intuition for finance, but it also exposes his caustic criticisms of lesser men and his tin ear for workaday diplomacy. The Americans considered him too bright for his britches and bottled him up at every opportunity.

White had prepared so well that the actual conference was well-orchestrated, everything the Americans wanted. “Now the advantage is ours here, and I personally think we should take it,” Morgenthau said to White, who fully agreed. As White said, “If the advantage was theirs, they would take it.”

The Americans wanted free trade and open markets; they feared postwar inflation. Bretton Woods helped by providing for stable but convertible currencies, tied within limits to the dollar and ultimately to gold. It also created the International Monetary Fund, a money pool from which nations with trade deficits could borrow to satisfy international accounts. And it set up what became the World Bank, initially focused on rebuilding Europe, and later on the developing world. Britain lost out on looser exchange rates, and its imperial trade preferences were doomed.

On item after item, Keynes found a stone wall. What Dr. Steil calls his “most tangible legacy” from Bretton Woods was pathetic. Norway moved to abolish the Bank for International Settlements for cooperating with the Nazis, a motion that Keynes vehemently opposed. The delegates eventually agreed that the bank would be “liquidated at the earliest possible moment.” The bank is still in business today.

Keynes ended up having to play an impossible hand. In 1945, he was left to sell Parliament on accepting arrangements that he had exhausted himself resisting. Four months later, he was dead. History later vindicated his advocacy of flexible exchange rates. The Bretton Woods system, not fully in effect till 1961, died only a decade later when President Richard M. Nixon ended the gold standard. The United States was running such large international deficits, paying out so many dollars, that not even Fort Knox had enough gold.

“The Battle of Bretton Woods” should become the gold standard on its topic. The details are addictive. But be warned: the book is dense. Every skirmish, every exchange — and the book gets into hundreds of thems — was presumably meaningful to the participants. But while some episodes mattered much, many did not. The author is no Robert Caro, who in his multivolume biography of Lyndon B. Johnson delves into minute details but also explains their larger significance.

Perhaps that is what is missing here — an unmistakable voice, a sense that this rich history is told by one mind. Mr. Caro is known for working on his own, with the assistance of his wife. In his acknowledgments, Dr. Steil thanks 10 research assistants and an advisory panel of 18 luminaries. The book sometimes reads like a succession of brilliant but loosely connected graduate seminar papers — an assemblage, a very fine one, but an assemblage nevertheless.

Economic View: Fed Monetary Policy Drives Best at Higher Speeds

First, what has the Fed done recently? Until September, its bond-buying program was explicitly limited in size and duration. Fed policy makers then replaced it with an open-ended program, whose pace was to be determined by progress in healing the labor market. And they adopted simpler, more positive explanations for their actions — jettisoning the gloomy, expectations-killing language that cited wretched economic prospects to justify every expansionary move.

Then, in December, the Fed surprised markets by replacing its somewhat confusing predictions for interest rates with numerical guidelines. It said it would keep the rate it controls — the federal funds rate — near zero at least until the unemployment rate fell below 6.5 percent or inflation rose above 2.5 percent.

Under the circumstances, it was significant that the policy makers took these actions at all. The economic data that came out before the September meeting were actually better than expected. And, based on forecasts released after the meeting, members of the Fed’s policy-making committee were slightly more optimistic about prospects for employment and output growth than they had been three months before. That they nevertheless adopted a more expansionary policy can be read as an admission that they hadn’t been doing enough earlier.

The pledge to keep rates low, even if inflation edged above 2 percent, is particularly consequential. For the last several years, the Fed has acted as if 2 percent were not just a target but a ceiling that should never be breached. But coming out of a terrible recession, with unemployment excruciatingly high, a period of very rapid growth is needed to repair the damage — and it wouldn’t be surprising for such growth to push inflation a bit over 2 percent. A Fed acknowledgment that 2.5 percent inflation would be tolerable for a short while isn’t a sign that it has lost its commitment to price stability. Instead, it’s a strong statement that it is committed to ensuring a faster recovery.

The more positive language, along with the “we’ll do whatever it takes” approach to bond buying, seems designed to reassure Americans that conditions will improve. This, too, is important. With short-term rates close to zero, the Fed’s main tool is expectations management. If it can persuade people to expect more growth — and yes, a little more inflation — it may help encourage companies to stop sitting on cash and start investing again.

The new policies are improvements, but I don’t want to oversell them. As I suggested in a previous column, a more definitive policy shift — like adopting a new target for monetary policy — would likely have a greater impact on expectations and in stimulating the recovery.

And the new policy’s numerical parameters are too conservative. According to the Fed’s own assessments, normal unemployment over the longer run is well below 6.5 percent. If inflation remains low and unemployment gets down to 6.5 percent, there’s no reason to rush to raise interest rates.

The most pressing problem, though, is that the Fed’s commitment to its new policies appears shaky. Soon after the December meeting, some members of the policy-making committee spoke out against the action — killing some of the positive buzz created by the policy statement and by a spirited news conference by the Fed chairman, Ben S. Bernanke. Also, the minutes of the December meeting showed that some who had voted for the new guidance on the fed funds rate were skeptical about the complementary action on bond-buying.

No one of the Fed’s recent actions is particularly powerful on its own, but together they create a sense of aggressive expansion and commitment to recovery. If the Fed now stops some of them, giving the public a mixed message, the positive effect on expectations could easily evaporate.

So why has the Fed moved slowly, and why are some policy makers threatening to undo the recent actions? In a recent paper, Prof. David Romer of the University of California, Berkeley (my husband), and I found that pessimistic views about the effectiveness and costs of expansionary actions have played a major role in limiting Fed moves over the last few years. Policy makers worry that such actions will do little good and that they could cause inflation, distortions in financial markets and losses on the Fed’s portfolio.

I can’t say for sure that those views are wrong today. We just don’t have enough experience with situations like the current one to have conclusive evidence one way or the other.

But our paper shows that in two periods when the Fed made terrible errors, the same kinds of pessimistic views were present. Faced with the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the high inflation of the early and late 1970s, monetary policy makers did little because they were convinced that action would be ineffective.

Subsequent events proved both decisions wrong. In the 1930s, a propitious gold inflow allowed the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt to conduct monetary expansion without the Fed. Real interest rates plummeted, expectations improved and investment spending and consumer purchases of durable goods took off — jump-starting the recovery. At the end of the 1970s, a new Fed chairman, Paul A. Volcker, concluded that monetary policy absolutely could reduce inflation, and he led the Fed to raise interest rates to historic highs. The recession that followed was painful, but inflation did come down — and it has been low ever since.

WHEN monetary policy makers meet again at the end of this month, they should keep these historical lessons in mind. At the very least, the Cassandras on the committee might want to reread the policy record from the 1930s. The degree to which some of them sound like their Depression-era counterparts might shock them — and give them pause.

The Fed’s new more aggressive policy shows every sign of being helpful, and there are no indications that the feared costs are materializing. So rather than trimming the policy before it can bear fruit, why not give it a chance?

Even better, why not give it some extra oomph? Rather than just continuing the bond-buying program, accelerate it somewhat. Instead of just reiterating the numerical guidelines on the funds rate, policy makers could follow the suggestion of Narayana Kocherlakota, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, that they lower to 5.5 percent the unemployment level at which the Fed starts to consider raising interest rates. And if Mr. Bernanke wanted to be truly aggressive, he could broach the idea that in a weak economy, a strong dollar isn’t necessarily desirable.

The important thing is that hypothetical fears shouldn’t stop the Fed’s evolution. History is on the side of doing more, not standing on the sidelines.

Christina D. Romer is an economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and was the chairwoman of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers.