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Friday, January 24, 2014
Thursday, January 9, 2014
Business Briefing | Regulatory News: Canada Ends 3-Year Inquiry Into Libor
Two Obama proposals offer sensible changes to the background check system.
The most vulnerable suffer when technology contracts are bungled.
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
China Graft Inquiry Sweeps Up Billionaire Oil Entrepreneur
Thursday, July 18, 2013
British Inquiry Ties 787 Fire to Beacon
Thursday, July 11, 2013
Inquiry Suggests Chance That Mechanical Failure Had Role in Crash
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: July 10, 2013
An earlier version of this article misidentified the retired 777 captain who flew for American Airlines and later Air India. He is Chuck Hosmer, not Robert Maurer.
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
Walgreen to Pay $80 Million Fine in D.E.A. Inquiry
Sunday, June 9, 2013
DealBook: France Expands Inquiry Into Tax Evasion at UBS
Michael Buholzer/ReutersThe Swiss bank UBS in Zurich.8:41 a.m. | Updated
PARIS – UBS, the biggest Swiss bank, is the target of a widening tax evasion investigation in France, a spokeswoman for the Paris prosecutor’s office said on Friday, an indication that the lender’s problems with the French government are growing.
A French judge on Thursday placed UBS AG, the Swiss parent company, under formal investigation on suspicion that it illegally sold banking services to French citizens that helped them to set up secret accounts abroad, according to Agnès Thibault-Lecuivre, the spokeswoman for the Paris prosecutor’s office. The Swiss bank also was identified as an ‘‘assisted witness,’’ a less serious status, in a concurrent investigation of suspected money laundering and tax evasion, she said.
The expanded inquiry comes just a week after the bank’s local subsidiary, UBS France, was put under formal investigation on similar suspicions. In the French legal system, a formal investigation, sometimes compared to an indictment in the American system, can drag on for years, and does not necessarily lead to charges or trial. An assisted witness is required to answer prosecutors’ questions with a lawyer present, but is thought less likely to ultimately face charges.
Yves Kaufmann Lobato, a UBS spokesman in Zurich, sought to play down the significance of the latest development, noting that the investigation had been the subject of news reports since early last year.
‘‘We will continue working with the authorities in France within the applicable legal framework to arrive at a resolution to this matter,’’ he added, citing a bank statement.
The investigators are examining the question of whether bankers from the Swiss parent company broke a French law against “illicit solicitation” by actively approaching potential French clients.
According to a report on Friday in the French newspaper Le Monde, UBS bankers regularly sought to ingratiate themselves into networks of affluent people, mingling at sporting events and concerts in order to seek out possible clients for tax evasion. At least 353 French citizens suspected of evading taxes through UBS have been identified, and the French government has sought administrative assistance from the Swiss government in four cases, the newspaper reported, without citing its source.
Mario Tuor, a spokesman for the Swiss Federal Finance Ministry in Bern, declined to comment on the case, saying the details were confidential.
There is a broad push in the United States and Europe to stop offshore banks from aiding tax cheats. Switzerland – where the secrecy laws punish banks for revealing client data – has been in an uncomfortable spotlight. In France, President François Hollande has made ending tax evasion a top priority after his former budget minister, Jérôme Cahuzac, was found to have set up secret Swiss and Singapore accounts to hide some of his wealth.
UBS itself has been under international scrutiny since 2008, when the United States Justice Department threatened to indict it for conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service. In 2009, UBS eventually agreed to pay a $780 million fine to avoid prosecution, and turned over data on 4,450 client accounts held by United States citizens suspected of evading taxes.
Obama administration officials followed that case with a broad push to expose all the American accounts hidden behind Swiss banking secrecy laws. With about a dozen Swiss lenders facing the possibility of indictment in the United States, the Swiss government agreed last month on a framework for banks to hand over information on American clients, a deal it hoped would permanently end the threat of United States prosecution. That agreement still must be approved by the Swiss legislature.
UBS said on Friday that it ‘‘fully supports the strategy of Switzerland to limit itself to the management of declared assets.’’
‘‘We believe that Switzerland and the countries of the E.U. need to find a solution for the past,’’ according to a statement from the bank. ‘‘This is an industry issue that UBS has taken significant steps to resolve since 2009. UBS does not tolerate any activities intended to help its clients circumvent their tax obligations.’’
Sunday, May 19, 2013
DealBook: SAC Says It Will Curb Cooperation With Insider Inquiry
9:00 p.m. | Updated The government’s insider trading investigation of the giant hedge fund SAC Capital Advisors entered a more contentious phase this week, with criminal authorities issuing a new round of subpoenas requesting information about the firm’s activities, according to lawyers briefed on the case.
The requests, which numbered more than a dozen, indicate that federal prosecutors and the F.B.I. are intensifying their efforts to build a case against the firm and its executives, including its billionaire founder, Steven A. Cohen, 56.
The government’s newly aggressive posture led to an unusual response from the hedge fund. On Friday, SAC told its investors in a letter that it was no longer fully cooperating with the investigation.
“While we have in the past told you of our cooperation with the government’s investigation, our cooperation is no longer unconditional,” the letter said.
Neither the firm nor Mr. Cohen has been charged with wrongdoing. The hedge fund owner has maintained that he has behaved appropriately at all times.
Still, over the last five years, SAC has been in the cross hairs of the government’s crackdown on illegal trading on Wall Street.
Nine former or current SAC employees have been tied to insider trading while at the fund; four of them have pleaded guilty. Earlier this year, SAC agreed to pay $616 million to settle two civil cases brought against it by the Securities and Exchange Commission, a move seen inside the firm as a major step toward resolving its role in the investigation.
But in recent days, the government signaled that its inquiry into the fund was far from over, if not escalating. The subpoenas asked for numerous trading records related to the buying and selling of specific stocks, as well as other documents, according to the lawyers.
The latest requests were frustrating for Mr. Cohen and his legal team, which led to the decision to take a tougher stand, lawyers briefed on the case said. SAC objected to certain aspects of the subpoenas.
As a result of the new requests, the fund decided that it could no longer provide its investors with updates on the inquiry.
A spokesman for SAC, Jonathan Gasthalter, declined to comment.
“In the past we have tried to be as transparent with you as possible about the state of the investigation, while balancing our desire for transparency with the need to keep the details of a sensitive investigation confidential,” SAC said in the letter sent on Friday to investors.
“During this period, however, the need for confidentiality will limit our ability to share with you details about how the investigation is progressing,” the letter said.
While SAC’s letter highlighted the more aggressive position taken toward the government, the fund also sought to allay its investors’ concerns about the state of the investigation. The firm said it expected that there would be “substantially more clarity” as to the outcome of the investigation in the coming months. It also said that its changed posture toward the inquiry would “not have a financial impact to our funds.”
SAC, which is based in Stamford, Conn., is fighting to keep its clients from withdrawing money from the $15 billion fund. It recently gave its investors an extension to decide whether to withdraw money, pushing back the deadline to June 3 from May 16. Earlier in the year, investors withdrew $1.7 billion from the fund, an amount that equals about 25 percent of the hedge fund’s outside money. (The balance of the fund, which is about $9 billion, consists mostly of Mr. Cohen’s fortune.)
The subpoenas and SAC’s response come as the fund awaits final resolution of the larger of the two civil settlements it struck with the S.E.C. earlier this year. In that case, SAC agreed to pay $602 million to resolve charges related to illegal trading in the pharmaceutical stock Elan and Wyeth. It neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing as part of the settlement.
The settlement requires the approval of the federal judge presiding over the case, Victor Marrero. Last month, he approved the agreement, but conditioned it on a pending decision from a federal appeals court in a case involving Citigroup. Judge Marrero raised concerns with the “neither admit nor deny” language that the regulatory agency includes in many of its settlements, an issue that the appeals court was expected to address in the Citigroup case.
Another concern for the hedge fund involves the two former SAC employees under indictment for insider trading: Mathew Martoma and Michael S. Steinberg. They are fighting the charges, but if either decided to plead guilty and cooperate, they could potentially help the government build its case.
Earlier this month, a judge set Mr. Steinberg’s trial for Nov. 18. Mr. Martoma, who was at the center of the Elan and Wyeth trades, has yet to receive a trial date.
Mr. Cohen directly participated in the questionable Elan and Wyeth trades, which were made in July 2008. Under the five-year statute of limitations for insider trading crimes, the authorities would have to file either criminal charges or a civil case against the hedge fund billionaire related to those trades by mid-July. The government has not said that Mr. Cohen knew any confidential information when he made those trades.
Despite the multitude of distractions, the SAC founder rubbed elbows with celebrities and socialites on Monday night at the Robin Hood Foundation’s annual gala in Manhattan. The benefit, which featured performances by Bono, Sting and Elton John, raised $72 million to fight poverty.
Friday, May 17, 2013
DealBook: Former BlackRock Manager Arrested in Insider Trading Inquiry
Mark Lennihan/Associated PressThe headquarters of BlackRock, the giant money manager, in New York.LONDON – Mark Lyttleton, a former BlackRock fund manager, has been arrested in connection with an insider trading investigation in Britain, according to two people briefed on the matter.
The arrest on April 30 of Mr. Lyttleton, 41, and an unidentified 37-year-old woman comes as the British financial regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, continues to clamp down on market abuse in London’s financial district after a series of recent scandals.
Mr. Lyttleton, who oversaw the firm’s underperforming UK Dynamic and BlackRock UK absolute alpha funds, left the firm on March 28 and has not been charged with any wrongdoing. His departure from BlackRock was not connected to the regulatory investigation, the people added, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
Under British law, individuals can been arrested as part of continuing investigations but they may not eventually face prosecution for potential wrongdoing. Any prospective indictments in the case would not be issued until late in 2013, at the earliest, one of the people said.
The Financial Conduct Authority of Britain said this month that two individuals had been questioned about insider trading and market abuse, and several homes and offices had been searched in Switzerland in connection with the investigation.
BlackRock confirmed on Tuesday that a former employee had previously been arrested by the City of London police on suspicion of insider trading. It said the accusations were related to personal activities by the individual and were not connected with dealings related to the firm’s clients.
“The alleged behavior is totally contrary to the firm’s principles and values,” BlackRock said in a statement on Tuesday. “The firm has been aiding and will continue to aid the authorities with their investigations.”
Spokesmen for the Financial Conduct Authority and BlackRock declined to comment further on the investigation. A representative for Mr. Lyttleton was not immediately available for comment.
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, British authorities have tried to shake off a reputation for light regulation by aggressively tackling market abuse allegations.
Over the last four years, the Financial Services Authority, the predecessor of the Financial Conduct Authority, successfully prosecuted 23 individuals for insider trading. Seven other people are facing prosecution on similar charges.
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Europe Raids Oil Companies in Price Manipulation Inquiry
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: May 14, 2013
An earlier version of this article misstated the day of the raid. It was Tuesday, not Thursday.
Saturday, May 11, 2013
F.D.A. Inquiry Leads Wrigley to Halt ‘Energy Gum’ Sales
Sunday, March 31, 2013
DealBook: Charmed Life Now Ensnared in a Trading Inquiry
8:55 p.m. | Updated
Friends of Michael S. Steinberg had always marveled at his good fortune.
In his mid-20s, he landed a job a SAC Capital Advisors, then a small hedge fund owned by Steven A. Cohen, who was fast developing a reputation on Wall Street as a stock trading wizard. As SAC posted stupendous returns year-after-year and became one of the world’s largest hedge funds, Mr. Steinberg earned tens of millions of dollars trading as a close associate of Mr. Cohen, and rose within the firm.
When Mr. Steinberg married at the Plaza Hotel a few years after joining SAC, his boss attended the black-tie affair. Mr. Steinberg and his family moved into an $8 million Park Avenue co-op and summered in the Hamptons. He also gave back, helping found Natan, a philanthropy that promotes Israel and Jewish culture.
Then, his charmed life came undone.
On Friday, Mr. Steinberg became the most senior SAC employee to be ensnared in the government’s multiyear insider trading investigation. F.B.I. agents showed up at his apartment on the Upper East Side of Manhattan and arrested him in the pre-dawn hours. Just the day before, Mr. Steinberg had returned from a vacation in Florida, where he and his family visited relatives and took a trip to Disney World.
Later on Friday, Mr. Steinberg, 40, in a black V-neck sweater and charcoal-gray slacks, appeared in Federal District Court in Manhattan and pleaded not guilty. Judge Richard J. Sullivan freed him on $3 million bail.
“Michael Steinberg did absolutely nothing wrong,” Barry H. Berke, a lawyer for Mr. Steinberg, said in a statement. “Caught in the cross-fire of aggressive investigations of others, there is no basis for even the slightest blemish on his spotless reputation.”
The arrest was the latest in a whirlwind of activity related to the government’s investigation of SAC. For years, federal agents have been building a case against the fund. This month, SAC agreed to pay $616 million to settle two civil insider trading actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. On Thursday, a federal judge refused to approve the larger settlement of $602 million, raising concerns over a provision that lets SAC avoid an admission of wrongdoing.
Including Mr. Steinberg, nine current or former SAC employees have been linked to insider trading while at the company; four have pleaded guilty. Some of the former employees who have been implicated hardly knew Mr. Cohen, who operates a sprawling $15 billion fund with more than 1,000 employees across the globe.
But Mr. Cohen and Mr. Steinberg were close. Mr. Steinberg is one of SAC’s most veteran employees, though he was recently placed on leave soon after being tied to an earlier case. He joined SAC shortly after graduating from the University of Wisconsin. When he began at SAC, it was just Mr. Cohen and several dozen traders. For years, he sat near Mr. Cohen on the trading floor in the fund’s headquarters in Stamford, Conn., and he was part of a team of tech-stock traders that posted outsize returns during the dot-com boom and bust. Later, he helped start Sigma Capital, an SAC unit in Midtown Manhattan.
While years apart, the two share the same hometown — Great Neck, N.Y., on Long Island, where both attended Great Neck North High School. They also share a love of art; Mr. Steinberg introduced Mr. Cohen to his childhood friend Sandy Heller, who became Mr. Cohen’s longtime art adviser.
In the past, SAC has distanced itself from former employees charged with insider trading, but on Friday, it issued a statement in support of Mr. Steinberg: “Mike has conducted himself professionally and ethically during his long tenure at the firm. We believe him to be a man of integrity.”
Federal investigators have tried to press lower-level SAC employees for information in helping them build a case against Mr. Cohen. In one instance, F.B.I. agents showed a former trader a sheet of paper with headshots of his former colleagues, with Mr. Cohen at the center. The agents compared the SAC founder to an organized-crime boss who sat atop a corrupt organization.
The pressure on Mr. Cohen, 56, escalated in November, when prosecutors charged Mathew Martoma, a former SAC portfolio manager, with trading in the drug stocks Elan and Wyeth based on confidential drug trial data that a doctor had leaked to him. Mr. Cohen was involved in drug stock trades, but the government has not claimed that he possessed any secret information. Those trades were the subject of the S.E.C. civil action that SAC settled for $602 million. Mr. Martoma has pleaded not guilty and has refused to cooperate with investigators.
Mr. Cohen has not been accused of any wrongdoing and has told his investors that he believes he has acted appropriately at all times.
Amid his legal woes, Mr. Cohen, whose net worth is estimated at about $10 billion, has gone on a shopping binge in recent days, paying $155 million for the Picasso painting “Le Rêve” and $60 million for an oceanfront estate in East Hampton on Long Island.
Mr. Steinberg’s name surfaced last fall, when a former SAC analyst pleaded guilty to being part of an insider-trading ring that illegally traded the technology stocks Dell and Nvidia. As part of his guilty plea, the analyst, Jon Horvath, implicated Mr. Steinberg, saying that he gave the confidential information to Mr. Steinberg and that they traded based on that data. On Friday, federal prosecutors charged Mr. Steinberg with conspiracy and securities fraud, accusing him of participating in the illegal Dell and Nvidia trades. The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a parallel civil lawsuit against Mr. Steinberg.
Last year, a jury convicted two hedge fund managers at other firms related to the Dell and Nvidia trades. E-mails from Mr. Steinberg that emerged in that trial were included in the indictment on Friday.
In one e-mail from August 2008, sent a few days before Dell’s quarterly earnings announcement, Mr. Horvath disclosed secret details about Dell’s financial data to Mr. Steinberg.
Mr. Horvath wrote that he had “a 2nd hand read from someone at the company.” He added, “Please keep to yourself as obviously not well known.”
Mr. Steinberg replied: “Yes normally we would never divulge data like this, so please be discreet.”
In another e-mail from the trial, Mr. Steinberg told Mr. Horvath and another portfolio manager, Gabe Plotkin, about a conversation he had with Mr. Cohen about conflicting views of Dell inside SAC. Mr. Plotkin owned a large Dell position, while Mr. Steinberg was short, meaning that he thought shares of Dell would drop in value.
“Guys, I was talking to Steve about Dell earlier today and he asked me to get the two of you to compare notes before the print” — meaning ahead of the company’s earnings release — “as we are on opposite sides of this one,” Mr. Steinberg wrote.
Since his name surfaced in the investigation, Mr. Steinberg has occasionally spent evenings in New York hotels to avoid being handcuffed at home in front of his two children. Federal agents refused to let Mr. Steinberg surrender of his own volition at F.B.I. headquarters downtown, expressing the view that white-collar defendants should not be given special treatment.
John Marshall Mantel for The New York TimesMichael Steinberg entered a plea of not guilty in Federal District Court in Manhattan on Friday and was freed on $3 million bail.This post has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: March 29, 2013
Because of incorrect information supplied by prosecutors, an earlier version of this article gave the wrong age for Michael Steinberg, the SAC Capital Advisors portfolio manager who was arrested on Friday. He is 40, not 41.
Sunday, March 24, 2013
DealBook: JPMorgan Chase Inquiry Reveals Status Quo After Financial Crisis
Daniel Rosenbaum for The New York TimesSenator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan.People have learned their lesson.
We’ve been told that so many times since the near-death experiences of the financial crisis. Bankers and regulators have flipped roles: now it’s the bankers who are cautious and their overseers who are aggressive.
Details of JPMorgan Chase’s multibillion-dollar trading loss — brought to light by a riveting and devastating report from the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations — demonstrate what a sham that is. Bankers aren’t acting cautious and chastened. Risk managers aren’t in the ascendance on Wall Street. Regulators remain their duped and docile selves.

What we now know about the incident is that, as the cliché has it, the cover-up was worse than the crime. The losses out of the London office weren’t enough to take down the bank. But as they were building, JPMorgan traders fiddled with risk measures and valuations. The bank’s risk managers defended the traders and pooh-poohed the flashing red signals. The bank gave incorrect information to its regulator. Top executives then made misleading statements to shareholders and the public. All the while, the regulator served its typical role of house pet.
As JPMorgan got into trouble, traders and the responsible executives treated the valuation of trading positions, made up of derivatives, as a puppet made to do what they wanted. The traders pulled on this calculation or that to change the way they were valuing the position to reduce the losses.
Ina Drew, the head of the bank’s chief investment office, referring to how the positions were calculated, asked an underling if he could “start getting a little bit of that mark back.” She then asked if he could “tweak at whatever it is I’m trying to show.” She might believe it is exculpatory that she prefaced the comment by saying to do it “if appropriate” and that the tweak should come with “demonstrable data,” but any idiot working for her would know exactly what she meant: create some rationale to manipulate the valuations to make things look better than they really are.
This discussion did not make it into the bank’s internal report on the incident from January. Imagine that.
Yes, Ms. Drew was ousted. But her actions show that what financial executives do postcrisis when faced with trouble is no different than what they did precrisis. In testimony on Friday, in a quiet voice, she deflected blame up to Mr. Dimon and down to her traders, claiming she was kept in the dark.
The Senate report makes it clear that JPMorgan misled shareholders and the public, particularly on its April 13, 2012, conference call.
That call, which makes up a particularly damning portion of the Senate report, featured a haughty Jamie Dimon famously dismissing the problem as a “tempest in a teapot.”
Of course, it was no such squall. In the call, the chief financial officer at the time, Douglas L. Braunstein, made a number of what appear to be misleading statements about the trades. Mr. Braunstein said the trading decisions were made on a very long-term basis, when in fact the traders were shuffling positions almost daily to make profits and then to disastrously “defend” their positions from further losses. Mr. Braunstein reassured investors and analysts in the call that the trades were vetted by the firm’s top risk managers, when they were not (though top officials, including Mr. Dimon, knew about repeated risk-measure breaches).
This means “there was risk oversight” for the office that made the trades, and the trading “positions needed to comply with limits,” a JPMorgan spokesman, Joseph Evangelisti, said. “We were not aware at the time of all the deficiencies in the risk organization” of the trading group.
In the conference call, Mr. Braunstein also said that the trades were “fully transparent to the regulators,” but, in fact, watchdogs didn’t receive any regular reporting of the positions and received specific information only days before the call.
“What Doug said was accurate,” Mr. Evangelisti said. “No one in senior management at that time believed there was a larger problem in the context of the firm’s size and scale.”
In JPMorgan’s internal report, the call receives scant attention. In testimony before Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the Senate subcommittee, Mr. Braunstein fell back on the explanation that he was saying what he believed at the time.
Mr. Braunstein wasn’t available for comment, according to the bank.
Maybe regulators will think it notable that the chief financial officer of JPMorgan misled shareholders in his first extensive comments about the trading losses. Don’t hold your breath.
I don’t even expect much to come out of the evidence that the bank misled regulators. The bank stopped giving its regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, important information. At one point, the bank told the agency that it was reducing the size of its positions when it was actually increasing those positions, according to the Senate report.
Despite JPMorgan’s smoke screens, the regulators deserve the public humiliation they have received. They were alerted to risk-measure breaches that should have warned them of problems. By April 30, 2012, just weeks after the trading debacle came to light and before any serious investigation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency declared the matter closed, according to internal minutes from a meeting. (At Friday’s hearing, officials from the agency disputed that it was, in fact, closed.)
So, yes, people have learned their lessons, the real lessons of the financial crisis. JPMorgan repeated the same misdeeds that other banks successfully pulled off at the height of the financial crisis: mismarking portfolios of assets and misleading the public. This was condoned by regulators. Regulators and prosecutors have been averting their eyes for years from rotted bank assets and rotted bank morals; why would JPMorgan expect any different reaction in this case?
Mr. Dimon and JPMorgan executives have all publicly donned hair shirts to demonstrate their contrition. Mr. Dimon and Mr. Braunstein even took pay cuts, going from earning many millions to some fewer millions.
JPMorgan argues that Mr. Dimon and Mr. Braunstein told regulators and the public only what they believed at the time. Mr. Dimon and Mr. Braunstein made mistakes, but they quickly worked to clean them up, fire those responsible and change their ways. The losses were small relative to the size of the bank and, if anything, demonstrate the strength of JPMorgan’s diversified business. After all, the bank made record earnings last year.
But I suspect that if you dosed JPMorgan executives with Pentothal, they would reveal they believed all of this attention was a media creation and political showboating — still a “tempest in a teapot.”
“Not true,” Mr. Evangelisti, the JPMorgan spokesman, said. “We acknowledged from the outset that we made significant mistakes, and we have repeatedly apologized for them. We do not blame the media or regulators for these issues. This was our fault totally. All we can do now is fix the problems and learn from them.”
As has happened so often in the wake of the financial crisis, we are left with the spectacle of bankers — here the well-compensated Mr. Dimon and Mr. Braunstein — insisting that they were clueless and incompetent, which would shield them from any allegations of intent to defraud.
As for many longtime officials at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, they may well think that this was merely a nuanced mistake that calls for nothing more than careful suggestions of remedies that don’t harm the bank too much. The new head of the agency, Thomas J. Curry, has begun to clean house and re-energize the place, but the overhaul that is needed looks too big for one person.
So let’s take a moment to celebrate a handful of American heroes, Mr. Levin and the staff members at the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Because of them, this corruption has come to light. Friday’s hearing served to emphasize how lonely Mr. Levin’s efforts are. Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona and the new ranking minority member on the committee, did a yeoman’s job of asking a few questions. Senator Ron Johnson, Republican of Wisconsin, made a few incoherent statements using the au courant phrase “too big to fail,” then scuttled out of the hearing. None of the other senators, Democrats and Republicans alike, bothered to show up.
The 78-year-old Mr. Levin, peering over those glasses that seem surgically attached to the tip of his nose, soldiered on.
But let’s imagine what would happen if this report does what the senator hopes and puts pressure on the regulators to finish a simplified and loophole-free Volcker Rule, which would prohibit banks from making bets for their own profit using taxpayer-backed money. Why should we have the slightest confidence that big banks could be persuaded to follow it? And why should we feel reassured that, if they didn’t, regulators could or would enforce it?
We shouldn’t. And we don’t.