Death Toll in Bangladesh Collapse Tops 1,100

SAVAR, Bangladesh (AP) — The police said Saturday that the death toll from the collapse of a garment-factory building in Bangladesh had soared past 1,100 as recovery operations continued.

Doctors said that a seamstress who was rescued Friday, 17 days after the eight-story building collapsed, was recovering in a hospital but was exhausted, panicked and dehydrated. On Saturday, rescue workers resumed digging through the rubble, and the death toll reached 1,115.

“We will not leave the operation until the last dead body and living person is found,” said Maj. Gen. Chowdhury Hasan Suhrawardy, the head of the local military units in charge of rescue operations.

The collapse of the building, Rana Plaza, which housed five garment factories, was the worst disaster in the industry’s history.

Opinion: Financial Collapse: A 10-Step Recovery Plan

Evidence of this forgetting is everywhere. The public has lost interest in the causes of the crisis; many, of course, are just struggling to get by. Unrepentant financiers whine about “excessive” regulation and pay lobbyists to battle every step toward reform. Conservatives bemoan “big government” and yearn to return to laissez-faire deregulation. Higher international standards for bank capital and liquidity have been delayed. I could go on.

Instead, let me try to encapsulate what we must remember about the financial crisis into 10 financial commandments, all of which were brazenly violated in the years leading up to the crisis.

1. Remember That People Forget

Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner lamented last year that before the crisis, “There was no memory of extreme crisis, no memory of what can happen when a nation allows huge amounts of risk to build up.” He was right. As the renegade economist Hyman Minsky knew, it is normal for speculative markets to go to extremes. A key reason, Minsky believed, is that, unlike elephants, people forget. When the good times roll, investors expect them to roll indefinitely. When bubbles burst, they are always surprised.

2. Do Not Rely on Self-Regulation

Self-regulation of financial markets is a cruel oxymoron. We need zookeepers to watch over the animals. The government must not outsource this function to “market discipline” (another oxymoron) or to for-profit companies like credit-rating agencies. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 isn’t perfect, but it has the potential to change regulation for the better. But most of its reforms are still being phased in, and as the rules are being drafted, the industry (here and abroad) is fighting them tooth and nail and often prevailing.

3. Honor Thy Shareholders

Boards of public corporations are supposed to protect the interests of shareholders, partly by monitoring the behavior of top executives, who are employees, not emperors. In the years before the crisis, too many directors forgot those responsibilities, and both their companies and the broader public suffered from the malign neglect. Will they now remember? Some will — for a while. But sanctions on directors for poor performance are minimal.

4. Elevate Risk Management

One bitter lesson of the crisis is that, when it comes to risk taking, what you don’t know can hurt you. Too many C.E.O.’s let their subordinates ride roughshod over risk managers, tipping the balance toward greed and away from fear. The primary responsibility for keeping risk-management systems up to snuff rests with top executives and boards of directors. But the Federal Reserve and other regulators are now watching and mustn’t let up.

5. Use Less Leverage

Excessive leverage — otherwise known as over-borrowing — was one of the chief foundations of the house of cards that collapsed so violently in 2008. Overpaid investment “geniuses” used leverage to manufacture extraordinary returns out of ordinary investments. Bankers and investors (not to mention home buyers) deluded themselves into thinking they could earn high returns without assuming big risks. But leverage is like alcohol: a little bit has health benefits, but too much can kill you. The banks’ near-death experiences, plus preparation for higher capital requirements to come, are temporarily keeping them sober. But watch for the binge drinking to return.

6. Keep It Simple, Stupid

Modern finance profits from complexity, because befuddled customers are more profitable ones. But do all those fancy financial instruments actually do the economy any good? Paul A. Volcker, the former Fed chairman, once said the A.T.M. was the only beneficial financial innovation in the recent past. He may have exaggerated, but he had a point. Who needs credit default swaps on collateralized debt obligations, and other such concoctions?

7. Standardize Derivatives and Trade Them on Exchanges

Derivatives acquired a bad name in the crisis. But if they are straightforward, transparent, well collateralized, traded in liquid markets by well-capitalized counterparties and sensibly regulated, derivatives can help investors hedge risks. It is the customized, opaque, “over the counter” derivatives that are the most dangerous — and the ones more likely to serve the interests of the dealers than their customers. Dodd-Frank pushed some derivatives toward greater standardization and transparent trading on exchanges, but not enough. The industry is pushing to keep more derivatives trading out of the sunshine.

8. Keep Things on the Balance Sheet

Before the crisis, some banks took important financial activities off their balance sheets to hide how much leverage they had. But the joke was on them. The crisis revealed that some chief executives were only dimly aware of the off-balance-sheet entities their banks held. These “masters of the universe” hadn’t mastered their own books. Dodd-Frank specifies that “capital requirements shall take into account any off-balance-sheet activities of the company.” That’s a welcome step toward making off-balance-sheet entities safe and rare. Now regulators must make the rule work.

9. Fix Perverse Compensation

Offering traders monumental rewards for success, but a mere slap on the wrist for failure, encourages them to take excessive risks. Chief executives and corporate directors should “claw back” pay when putative gains turn into losses. If they don’t, we may need the heavy hand of government to do it.

10. Watch Out for Consumers

The meek won’t inherit their fair share of the earth if they are constantly being fleeced. What we learned in the crisis is that failure to protect unsophisticated consumers from financial predators can undermine the whole economy. That surprising lesson mustn’t be forgotten. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should institutionalize it.

Mark Twain is said to have quipped that while history doesn’t repeat itself, it does rhyme. There will be financial crises in the future, and the next one won’t be a carbon copy of the last. Neither, however, will it be so different that these commandments won’t apply. Financial history does rhyme, but we’re already forgetting the meter.

Alan S. Blinder is a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton, a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve and the author of “After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response and the Work Ahead.”

Judge Clears United Airlines in a 9/11 Collapse

A federal judge in Manhattan ruled Wednesday that United Airlines was not responsible for the collapse of a third World Trade Center building on Sept. 11, 2001.

The plaintiff in the case, Larry Silverstein, the leaseholder of the World Trade Center property, claimed that the collapse of 7 World Trade Center stemmed from airport security lapses that allowed hijackers to crash an American Airlines plane into the complex.

Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein granted a request by United and its parent, United Continental Holdings, to dismiss Mr. Silverstein’s claims. Tower 7 collapsed several hours after being pierced by debris from the crash of American Airlines Flight 11 into the nearby 1 World Trade Center. Two of the Flight 11 hijackers, Mohammed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari, began their trip to New York at the Portland International Jetport, in Maine. They boarded a flight to Logan International Airport in Boston, from which they connected to the American Airlines plane.

Mr. Silverstein’s lawyers argued that because United was among the airlines that ran Portland’s only security checkpoint, it was legally responsible for the screening of all passengers and had missed a “clear chance” to prevent the hijacking.

But Judge Hellerstein of Federal District Court in Manhattan concluded that United could not have foreseen the events that led to the destruction of Tower 7.

“It was not within United’s range of apprehension that terrorists would slip through the security screening checkpoint, fly to Logan, proceed through another air carrier’s security screening and board that air carrier’s flight, hijack the flight and crash it into 1 World Trade Center, let alone that 1 World Trade Center would therefore collapse and cause Tower 7 to collapse,” Judge Hellerstein wrote.

In 2009, he dismissed claims against other airlines for damages caused by United Flight 175, which also hit the Twin Towers.

Bud Perrone, a spokesman for Silverstein Properties, said it was disappointed in Wednesday’s ruling, but would continue to pursue a negligence case over Flight 175.

DealBook: As Labor Talks Collapse, Hostess Turns Out Lights

What might be the last Twinkie in America — at least for a while — rolled off a factory line Friday morning. It was just like the millions that had come before it, golden, cream-filled empty calories, a monument to classic American junk food.

But it is likely to be the last under the current management. After not one but two bankruptcies, Hostess Brands, the beleaguered purveyor of Twinkies, Ho Hos, Sno Balls and Wonder bread, announced plans to wind down operations and sell off its brands.

Since filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in January, Hostess has been trying to renegotiate its labor contracts in a bid to cut costs. But the talks fell apart, and last week one union went on strike.

The so-called liquidation will probably spell the end of Hostess, an 82-year-old company that has endured wars, countless diet fads and even an earlier Chapter 11 filing. Although the company could theoretically negotiate a last-minute deal with the union, Hostess is moving to shut factories and lay off a large majority of its 18,500 employees.

But Twinkies and the other well-known brands could eventually find new life under a different owner. As part of the process, Hostess is looking to auction off its assets, and suitors could find value in the portfolio.

“The potential loss of iconic brands is difficult,” said the company’s chief executive, Gregory F. Rayburn. “But it’s overshadowed by the 18,500 families that are out of work.”

The company’s current problems stem, in part, from the legacy of its past.

An amalgam of brands and businesses, the company has evolved over the years through acquisitions. In the 1960s and 1970s, the company, then called Interstate, bought more than a dozen regional bakeries scattered across the country. A couple of decades later, it paid $330 million for the Continental Baking Company, picking up a portfolio of brands like Wonder and Hostess.

As the national appetite for junk food waned, the company fell on hard times, struggling against rising labor and commodity costs. In 2004, it filed for bankruptcy for the first time.

Five years later, the company emerged from Chapter 11 as Hostess Brands, so named after its most prominent division. With America’s new health-conscious attitude, it sought to reshape the business to changing times, introducing new products like 100-calorie Twinkie Bites.

But the new private equity backers loaded the company with debt, making it difficult to invest in new equipment. Earlier this year, Hostess had more than $860 million of debt.

The labor costs, too, proved insurmountable, a situation that has been complicated by years of deal-making. The bulk of the work force belongs to 12 unions, including the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union.

The combination of debt and labor costs has hurt profits. The company posted revenue of $2.5 billion in the fiscal year 2011, the last available data. But it reported a net loss of $341 million.

With profits eroding, the company filed for Chapter 11 in January. It originally hoped to reorganize its finances, seeking lower labor costs, including an immediate 8 percent pay cut.

The negotiations have been contentious.

The Teamsters, which has 6,700 members at Hostess, said it played an instrumental role in ousting Hostess’s previous chief executive, Brian J. Driscoll, this year after the board tripled his compensation to $2.55 million. The union also hired a financial consultant, Harry J. Wilson, who had worked on the General Motors restructuring.

While highly critical of management missteps, the Teamsters agreed in September to major concessions, including cuts in wages and company contributions to health care. As part of the deal, the union was to receive a 25 percent share of the company’s stock and a $100 million claim in bankruptcy.

“The objective was to preserve jobs,” said Ken Hall, the Teamsters’ general secretary-treasurer. “When you have a company that’s in the financial situation that Hostess is, it’s just not possible to maintain everything you have.”

But Hostess reached an impasse with the bakery union. Frank Hurt, the union’s president, seemed to lose patience with Hostess’s management, upset that it was in bankruptcy for the second time despite $100 million in labor concessions. He saw little promise that management would turn things around.

“Our members decided they were not going to take any more abuse from a company they have given so much to for so many years,” said Mr. Hurt. “They decided that they were not going to agree to another round of outrageous wage and benefit cuts and give up their pension only to see yet another management team fail and Wall Street vulture capitalists and ‘restructuring specialists’ walk away with untold millions of dollars.”

About a month ago, Mr. Rayburn said, the bakers union stopped returning the company’s phone calls altogether. For its part, the bakery union said the company had taken an overly aggressive approach. David Durkee, the union’s secretary-treasurer, said Hostess had given an ultimatum. “They said, ‘If you do not ratify this, we are going to liquidate based on your vote.’ ”

With the company standing firm, the bakery union struck last week, affecting nearly two-thirds of the company’s factories across the country. The Teamsters drivers honored the picket line, further shutting down the operations. The company gave union members until 5 p.m. on Thursday to return to work.

Mr. Rayburn said the financial strain of the strike was too much for the company, which had already reached the limits of its bankruptcy financing. Over the last week, Hostess lost tens of millions of dollars as many customers’ orders went unfilled. And its lenders would not open their wallets one more time.

By Thursday morning, Hostess’s executives were ensconced in the company’s headquarters in Irving, Tex., still hoping that enough employees would return to work to resume production. A small number of workers had already crossed the picket lines that had sprung up at most of the baker’s factories, but more than 10 plants remained well below their necessary capacity.

Mr. Rayburn’s deadline of 5 p.m. passed without either side backing down. Soon after, executives asked the company’s legal advisers to finish the court motions that would begin the liquidation. Papers had been drawn up well before that afternoon.

Around 7 p.m., Mr. Rayburn had his final discussions with the company’s board and his senior managers and made the call to begin winding down.

“We were trying to focus on where people were having success, but I had to make a call,” Mr. Rayburn said.

High & Low Finance: Euro Avoids Collapse, but Its Future Remains Uncertain

Only a few months ago, it was front-page news. Would the euro collapse? Would most of southern Europe go broke, unable to borrow money at any reasonable rate? Would that bring on a new world recession?

But in this week’s foreign policy debate between President Obama and Mitt Romney, the euro never came up. Europe was mentioned once, but the reference had nothing to do with economics. Mr. Romney did refer to Greece, but only to say we were in danger of going down the same path if we did not change our ways.

To a surprising extent, the perception seems to be that the European situation is under control. That is true if all you worry about is whether bondholders will get paid. It is false if you have a broader perspective.

The focus of the last couple of years on borrowing costs for peripheral members of the euro zone was, in retrospect, unfortunate. It was always clear that Europe, as a whole, had the ability to solve that issue if it wished to do so. The European Central Bank, like the United States Federal Reserve, has the ability to print money, and that is what it finally did.

But the real issue was — and remains — whether the peripheral countries could turn into successful economies while staying in the euro zone. On that issue, progress is painfully slow.

“The actions of the E.C.B. and other policy makers in Europe have generally had the effect of filling large financial gaps in periphery bank and sovereign funding,” wrote Bob Prince of Bridgewater Associates this week, “but have done relatively little to resolve competitive imbalances among these economies.”

Banks are hesitant to lend. On Thursday, the European Central Bank report on loan activity in September showed a record 1.4 percent year-over-year decline in loans outstanding to private sector companies and individuals in the euro zone. “These numbers are rather consistent with the bleak picture painted by business surveys, showing an ongoing contraction of activity,” wrote François Cabau and Phillippe Gudin of Barclays Capital in a note to clients.

If peripheral countries simply had fixed exchange rates, rather than a common currency, they could and almost certainly would have devalued their currencies long before now. That is the normal prescription for countries in financial distress. Couple it with austerity and revivals can be surprisingly rapid, as exports surge and imports plunge.

As it is, the process is sure to be long and painful, but not certain to succeed.

As Europe stumbles and slows, there has been a temptation in the United States to turn our attention elsewhere, to Asia for economic reasons and to the Mideast for political ones. Mr. Romney has tried to add South America to that mix. But neither the Romney nor Obama campaign has wanted to talk much about Europe, a fact that has been noted with a little alarm in Europe.

Richard Lambert, the chancellor of Britain’s Warwick University — and a former editor of The Financial Times as well as a former central banker — was in New York this week trying to convince Americans that they should care, and predicting that the euro will survive.

“The European Union has the capacity to get its affairs into order, if it has the political determination to do so,” he said in a speech at New York University. “This is a crisis about economic imbalances within the euro zone, more than it is about fault lines with the rest of the world.”

That is a point worth remembering. The euro zone as a whole is running smaller budget and current account deficits than is the United States. If it were one country, there might be articles about depressed regions, but not talk of collapse.

But it is not one country. It is taking halting steps in that direction, with a move to unified bank supervision, but political union is not going to happen; Angela Merkel’s name is never going to be on a ballot outside of Germany. Nor is there going to be easy labor mobility around Europe, even though that is supposedly guaranteed now. Cultural and language differences assure that.

Floyd Norris comments on finance and the economy at nytimes.com/economix.