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Monday, October 7, 2013
Your Money: Questions Often Asked About Health Law
Saturday, August 24, 2013
Questions for Microsoft as It Nears a Crossroad
Justin Lane/European Pressphoto AgencySteven A. Ballmer, chief of Microsoft and a friend of the company’s chairman, Bill Gates, said he would retire in the next year. Microsoft’s plan, announced Friday, to replace Steven A. Ballmer as its chief executive does not exactly follow — at least to people outside the company — the way they draft these things in business school.
News from the technology industry, including start-ups, the Internet, enterprise and gadgets.On Twitter: @nytimesbits.
Steven SinofskyLeft Microsoft last year amid friction and is seen as unlikely to return. But Mr. Ballmer and Microsoft’s board have been considering the possibility of his retirement for some time. Still, because of Mr. Ballmer’s larger-than-life personality, the board’s reluctance to push back and the company’s recent product and financial problems, finding a new chief executive for Microsoft was never going to resemble a cut-and-dry, business-school case study, according to people with knowledge of the company. “No one is an obvious candidate,” said Michael A. Cusumano, a professor of business and engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies strategy in the computer software industry. “All the really interesting people who were in the company over the last dozen years who might have been have left. I also find it hard to imagine they could bring an outsider in. Microsoft is known for having quite a lot of powerful groups within the company and they make life very difficult for anyone who tries to oversee them.” Succession planning is a delicate issue for many companies, particularly one like Microsoft, where Mr. Ballmer has been a senior employee since 1980 and chief executive since 2000, and his longtime friend, Bill Gates, Microsoft’s co-founder, remains chairman. “Particularly for a person like Ballmer, who really is one of the founders, leaving is almost like death, so it’s extremely difficult to have an orderly process,” said Joseph L. Bower, a professor at the Harvard Business School. “It requires a very grown-up relationship between the chief executive and his board.” Industry insiders almost immediately began to place bets on which executives inside and outside Microsoft — and even outside the technology industry — could be tapped. The decision will go a long way to determining whether Microsoft will successfully transition to tech’s future of mobile computing and computing in a virtual cloud of data-storage devices. But at the moment, at least, the betting cards are virtually empty. Even though Mr. Ballmer had indicated he was going to retire when the youngest of his children went to college, which was in about two more years, “I think people thought Ballmer would maybe die with his boots on in that role,” Mr. Cusumano added. Developing a succession plan is one of a board’s chief responsibilities, but only half of companies actively groom executives, according to a 2010 study by Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance and Heidrick & Struggles, the executive search firm that is leading Microsoft’s search. Boards spend only an average two hours a year on succession planning, the study found. “When you have such strong personalities as Gates and Ballmer, is the board really proactive with them, or is it more of a caretaker board?” said David Larcker, director of corporate governance research at Stanford University’s business school, who worked on the study. Though it might not be obvious outside the boardroom, Microsoft’s directors have been planning the transition, according to a person briefed on the board’s meetings who was not authorized to speak about them publicly. Discussions have been happening for a decade, the person said, and intensified in 2010. Several months ago, Mr. Ballmer suggested to the board that it was time to begin a formal succession process, the person said, and told directors on Wednesday that he would announce his retirement. Mr. Ballmer and the board have discussed the attributes they want in the next chief executive and have been appraising internal and external executives who might be candidates. Over the last 18 to 24 months, Mr. Ballmer has personally met with several outside executives, including people outside the tech industry with experience transforming very large companies, according to the person knowledgeable about the board’s work.
Nick Wingfield contributed reporting.
Tuesday, July 23, 2013
Helen Thomas | 1920-2013: 50 Years of Tough Questions and ‘Thank You, Mr. President’
Mark Landler contributed reporting.
Monday, July 22, 2013
Helen Thomas | 1920-2013: 50 Years of Tough Questions and ‘Thank You, Mr. President’
Mark Landler contributed reporting.
Saturday, July 13, 2013
DealBook: JPMorgan Chase Faces Questions on Potential New Capital Rules
Justin Lane/European Pressphoto AgencyDuring an earnings call on Friday, stock analysts asked questions JPMorgan Chase about how a potentially nettlesome regulation might affect the bank.It’s often the case that when someone doesn’t want to talk about something, it only invites more questions.
That’s certainly how it felt on a conference call that JPMorgan Chase held Friday to discuss its second-quarter financial results. The earnings were relatively strong. Yet for much of the call, the stock analysts who cover JPMorgan asked questions about how a potentially nettlesome regulation might affect the bank.
The bank’s chief financial officer, Marianne Lake, was willing to discuss the subject, but only up to a point. There was one number she seemed to not want to reveal. The issue relates to something called the leverage ratio, a measure of how much capital a bank has.
Since the financial crisis of 2008, regulators have been introducing new rules on capital because they feel higher capital levels makes banks more able to weather storms. That’s because capital can act as a financial cushion that absorbs losses in troubled times. To measure whether it is sufficient, capital is often expressed as a percentage of a bank’s assets. For instance, a bank with $3 in capital and $100 in assets would have a leverage ratio of 3 percent.
This week, regulators proposed a new leverage ratio rule. They want large banks to hold capital that meets a certain percentage of assets, plus other risks embedded in their balance sheets. And it measures the ratios at different places in the bank’s corporate structure.
At the parent company, the leverage ratio would effectively have to be 5 percent. Meanwhile, regulators want the ratio to be 6 percent at the banking subsidiaries that are covered by federal deposit insurance.
The banks have two months to comment on the rules, during which they are almost certainly going to request changes. Once the proposed rules are put into effect, banks will have until the end of 2017 to comply with the new leverage ratios.
On Friday, JPMorgan Chase estimated that it was already close to meeting the 5 percent requirement at its holding company, saying it had enough capital to get to a 4.7 percent leverage ratio there.
Naturally, analysts also wanted to know whether JPMorgan Chase’s deposit-gathering subsidiaries, which are far larger than the holding company, were close to meeting the 6 percent requirement.
“Do you have any sense that you could give us of where you stand on the leverage ratio at the bank level today relative to the 6 percent requirement?” John McDonald, a bank analyst at Bernstein Research, asked on Friday.
Marianne Lake, the chief financial officer at JPMorgan Chase.Ms. Lake responded that she would not disclose the bank leverage ratio. She added that it was lower than at the holding company.
A few minutes later, Betsy Graseck, a bank analyst at Morgan Stanley, tried. “I’m just wondering why no bank-sub disclosure. I realize that is different, but — and I heard your answer earlier — but I’m just wondering,” she asked, why the number was not provided.
Ms. Lake replied, “So, Betsy, there’s nothing sinister underlying it.”
The chief financial officer did offer some hints, however.
She said the bank subsidiary leverage ratio would be “small tens of basis points” lower than the 4.7 percent level at the holding company. A basis point is a hundredth of a percentage point. Therefore, the leverage ratio for JPMorgan Chase’s bank subsidiaries might be around 4.4 percent.
Under the proposed rules, those entities would eventually have to increase their capital holdings so they are at 6 percent.
Right now, that would mean JPMorgan Chase would have to raise capital by $40 to $50 billion at the subsidiaries. Analysts at Goldman Sachs and Keefe, Bruyette & Woods estimate a shortfall of as much as $47 billion, which is a far higher theoretical dollar deficit than exists at other large banks’ insured subsidiaries.
(However, Bank of New York Mellon’s deficit is higher as a percentage of existing capital, according to Keefe, Bruyette & Woods).
A capital hole of nearly $50 billion is significant even for a bank as big and profitable as JPMorgan Chase. That may be why the bank didn’t want to go into further detail. The fact that its dollar deficit seems to dwarf that of other banks may also be a source of discomfort. For instance, Goldman analysts estimate Citigroup only falls short by $10 billion at its insured entities.
Mark Kornblau, a JPMorgan Chase spokesman, declined to add to what the bank’s executives said on the Friday call about the leverage ratio.
On that call, JPMorgan Chase executives said the bank could increase its leverage ratio at the bank subsidiaries by moving assets or unwinding derivatives, the financial contracts that generate substantial trading revenue for JPMorgan Chase (as well as some losses, as shown by the London whale debacle last year).
Indeed, if JPMorgan does end up getting hit harder by the new leverage ratio, it may not be a complete accident.
Regulators have long tolerated immense amounts of Wall Street business taking place within insured subsidiaries. But the proposed leverage ratio may be the regulators’ new way of forcing banks to hold higher capital to protect against potential trading losses in such entities.
Goldman Sachs estimates it would take JPMorgan Chase two and a half years to earn the capital it needs to plug the hypothetical gap at is subsidiaries. This matters for shareholders. Using earnings to bolster capital might restrict what the bank can pay out in dividends and spend on stock buybacks. On Friday, JPMorgan Chase’s chief executive, Jamie Dimon, said the bank could step up distributions to shareholders and meet the new leverage ratio requirements. A bank of JPMorgan Chase’s profitability probably can do both.
Still, shareholders might feel more confidence about that assertion if the bank had detailed just how much extra capital it might have to find.
Wednesday, May 29, 2013
Corner Office: Getting Ahead by Having Answers Instead of Questions
This interview has been edited and condensed.
Monday, March 18, 2013
City Controller Questions Plan to Eliminate Public Defenders
Tuesday, March 5, 2013
DealBook: China’s Push to Cool Down Housing Raises Questions
Kim Kyung-Hoon/ReutersA man looks around a miniature of new apartment complex at a showroom in Beijing.Chinese shares fell the most in two years on Monday as the Shanghai stock exchange’s property index tumbled 9.25 percent. Late on Friday, China’s State Council had announced a new set of policies designed to cool down the housing market.
Economic data released in the last few days has called into question the strength of China’s recovery. It may be that Beijing is so confident in the health of the economy that it can afford to squeeze the real estate sector harder. Or it may be that the government is so concerned about the social implications of a resurgent property market and the effect that real estate may have on the effort to rebalance the economy toward consumption from investment, that it is willing to take that risk.
The new rules include a 20 percent tax on gains from a sale, higher down payments and mortgage rates, and requirements that cities set annual price easing targets. The announcement was met with both skepticism and criticism.

This latest round of real estate controls is the ninth in the last 10 years, yet prices have increased markedly, and some on the Internet questioned the legality of levying taxes through administrative means and called for much more transparency and accountability in how the government might spend the proceeds.
Clearly investors are spooked, though as Yao Wei, chief economist at Societe Generale CIB wrote, according to Reuters:
“The actual impact of the new policy can be very severe or not severe at all, depending on implementation. But the wording is unexpectedly harsh. … In three months time, the impact may not be big at all. But it has stirred very high negative expectations.”
The announcement on Friday spurred a surge in existing home transactions. Some analysts, and most of the people with whom I have spoken, expect the tax to have the perverse effect of driving up the price of existing homes, as buyers will have to cover most of the tax, and pushing more of the sale into a side contract to hide both the true price and gains from the government.
The real estate market in China is already quite distorted, and these repeated rounds of repressive policies may be just layering on more distortions. But the changes required for a more rational housing market are so difficult that in the near term it is easier to try to manage through administrative fiat.
Christian Hartmann/ReutersZhang Xin, chief executive of Soho China.In a bit of good timing for CBS, this week’s “60 Minutes” had two segments on Chinese real estate. The first was an interview with the billionaire developer Zhang Xin, chief executive of Soho China. “China’s Real Estate Bubble,” the second segment, examines the phenomenon of “Ghost Cities” that many China bears have highlighted over the last several years, complete with visits to the same empty malls and developments that we have been hearing about for years.
Jonathan Anderson of Emerging Advisors Group is out with a provocative report about those ghost cities. In “Hurray for Ghost Cities,” Mr. Anderson argues that these wasted investments are not really a big deal, adding that it might be better that the money was blown on developments rather than even more excess manufacturing.
Tom Miller is also mostly dismissive of the “Ghost Cities problem” in his excellent new book “China’s Urban Billion.” In one chapter, Mr. Miller writes:
The truth of the matter is that China is not building too many apartments, and a handful of empty urban districts are not evidence of a giant property bubble. Chinese property investment may be inefficient, but it is sustained by a huge, growing and sustainable demand for new housing. …
China’s current modern housing stock, defined as homes with individual bathrooms and kitchens, is around 150 million units. But 200 million migrant workers currently live in dormitories or slum housing. If one believes that the urban poor deserve to live in proper flats, the corollary is that Chinese cities actually have a significant shortage of housing – somewhere in the region of 70 million units. China is not building too many new apartments; it is building too few.
I do not mean to completely dismiss some of the dangerous imbalances that have been building in certain property markets across China. But China is not one real estate market, and taking a binary boom-or-bust view about the “China market” is likely a mistake.
The Financial Times examined the diverging markets last week, writing:
China takes bifurcation to a new extreme. Not only are housing prices in the biggest cities moving in a different direction to those in smaller centers, there is also a glaring discrepancy in the amount of development being undertaken.
The country’s main metropolises – Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, which each have populations of more than 10 million – suffer from chronic shortages of housing for low- to middle-income residents. By contrast, scores of smaller cities with populations of up to 3 million face an increasingly severe oversupply.
This is why a simple description of China’s housing market as a “bubble” misses the point. Does “bubble” refer to the soaring prices in the biggest cities, where only the wealthy can afford homes? Or does it refer to the row upon row of empty apartment blocks in the smaller cities?
One of the crucial questions, for which very smart people offer very different answers, is can bubbles burst in certain areas without bringing down the whole economy?
Regardless of how that question is answered, we should perhaps give China’s leaders some credit for acknowledging potential bubbles and taking steps to rein them in. What might have been different if American policy makers had recognized and tried to manage the risks of a housing bubble in 2005, 2006 or 2007?
Tuesday, February 26, 2013
Analysis: Amid Tears Lance Armstrong Leaves Unanswered Questions in Oprah Winfrey Interview
Monday, January 7, 2013
Criminal Practice: Defense Counsel Raise Questions About Indicting Grand Juries
Do Voir Dire Questions Inject Bias Into Your Jury?
Thursday, December 13, 2012
More Questions, No Verdict in Phila. Priest Sex-Abuse Trial
Sunday, November 4, 2012
More Questions, No Verdict in Phila. Priest Sex-Abuse Trial
Thursday, November 1, 2012
The Lede Blog: David Barboza Answers Reader Questions on Reporting in China
The Times’s Shanghai bureau chief, David Barboza, reported last week that close relatives of Wen Jiabao, the prime minister of China, hold billions of dollars in hidden riches. Here are his answers to questions from readers prompted by the article.
As the NY Times’s Shanghai bureau chief, I assume you are a China old hand. I’m curious about what prompted you to write this article? What was your rationale for the timing of this article? Have you ever got a feeling of being used? — Casablanca
I have been in China since 2004, and as a correspondent for the Business section, I have focused my reporting energies on economic, financial and business issues. Throughout my tenure in China there has been a lot of discussion about whether the families of high-ranking government officials have benefited from the country’s economic transformation by receiving so-called secret shares in corporations. This is a regular topic of dinner conversation when bankers, lawyers and accountants gather in Shanghai and Beijing. I had been told many times that this is typically done by using “nominee investors,” friends or people not easily identifiable in the shareholder records as having ties to politicians. These nominees, I was told, often hold shares for the relatives of powerful politicians, giving them a stake in a company.
About a year ago, as I was reporting a series of articles about China’s state-managed economy, I decided to see if there was any evidence behind the theory. I started looking into the business ties of several high-ranking leaders. Anyone who knows business and finance in China knows that the conjecture about the prime minister’s relatives was particularly persistent, so my focus eventually narrowed on the Wen family. I knew this would be a time-consuming and difficult task, but I was determined to answer this question. I plowed in, and to my great surprise found that there was a tremendous amount of information available in the public record. My reporting did not find illegality or corruption. It did reveal the names of Mr. Wen’s relatives hidden behind dozens of investment vehicles that few people had ever heard of.
I almost believed all the allegations against Wen in your article (most of the report pointing him as double-handed and heavily involved in the alleged corruptions) until the end of your report, which indicates that he almost divorced his wife because of her questionable business deals, and he was willing to let history judge him. Unfortunately, most people would not finish reading such a lengthy report, or their opinions have been formed based on the first half of your report…. Please enlighten me and other readers how you can justify your strong allegations first and then hinting you may not be sure of the allegations. Let me be clear: We are all fed up with corruptions in China (and elsewhere), but I am afraid your report may cause confusions to the readers, and leading to much tighter government control – meaning more corruptions and left-leaning policies in China in the future. Hope that is not what you are wishing for. — Pacific, USA
I have to disagree with your assertion that I first listed strong allegations and then suggested I wasn’t sure about the allegations.
My goal in undertaking this story was to determine whether the relatives of the prime minister had large stakes in Chinese companies, and to figure out how much wealth they had accumulated. If there were clues as to how these relatives made their fortunes, that would obviously tell us something about how things work in China for the relatives of senior leaders.
I didn’t make allegations, I described my findings: the relatives of the prime minister have controlled a fortune that has had a value of at least $2.7 billion over the last decade, according to the public records I reviewed.
As with all reporting on any given subject, we did not conduct our investigation in a vacuum. We went directly to the people whose names appeared on the documents we tracked. We made repeated efforts to reach the prime minister and his various relatives to give them the opportunity to discuss the documents or to refute our findings. They did not respond or declined to comment. So the next best option was to explore the public record and share with our readers what the prime minister has said publicly about corruption and whether he has sought personal gain. We also cited documents released by the WikiLeaks organization because they also shed light on the subject and might help the reader better understand the context of our findings. There was an interesting State Department cable from 2007, which refers to the prime minister and his family’s business dealings.
First of all, thanks for publish the article. It’s an eye opening. My question is what are the implication of your article on the upcoming communist transition on November 8, 2012? Obviously, there’s someone trying to discredit Wen Jiabao and his reformist faction. Who would benefit the most from your article? Is it Wu Bangguo and Zhou Yongkang’s hardline faction?
I have a strange feeling that New York Times has become a tool in a factional struggle between different factions of Communist party. Your article is not exactly surprising, it’s an open secret that nobody’s hand was clean in China’s leadership. The whole government was corrupt. It’s impossible to be an honest government official. Only thing surprising is the scale of corruption, I was thinking hundreds of millions before, thanks to NY Times, now I know it’s in billions. — Jordan, Bend, Ore.
My apologies. I have to confess that I’m a business correspondent and do not cover Beijing politics, nor was the Party Congress a focus of my investigation. So I can’t really tell you the political implications of this article. You may have seen a comment in the article from Minxin Pei, who is at Claremont McKenna College. He believes this will weaken Wen in the last months of his term. There are two other experts who specialize in this area — Li Cheng and Kenneth Lieberthal, both at the Brookings Institution in Washington. We may be hearing more from them in the coming weeks about the 18th Party Congress and the transition, which will involve naming the next president, widely expected to be Xi Jinping, and a new prime minister to replace Wen Jiabao, likely to be Li Keqiang. My colleagues in Beijing are in the midst of a fascinating series about that transition called “Changing of the Guard.”
It is interesting that a few days ago, several Chinese sites reported that a thick bundle of material about Wen’s family wealth was sent to major US news agent by unidentified parties. The speculation was that this was the revenge for people who are sympathetic to Bo Xilai. Could Times tell us why it decided to do this now to Wen even though rumor about it had been going for years. Has the intentional leak played any role in the timing? If yes, I think that Times should mention it. This is a tremendous reporting, but it would be useful for the readers to know the context of this report. We would actually learn more about intricates about Chinese politics. –Joy, Poughkeepsie
Your questions are excellent. Why now? Because it took that long to gather and evaluate the evidence, which involved thousands of pages of corporate and regulatory documents that we obtained through public record requests to various government entities in China.
I began looking into the business dealings of Wen Jiabao’s family late last year. I had been working on a series called “Endangered Dragon,” which looked at China’s government-managed economy, and wanted to include a piece that would give deeper insight into how China’s capitalism worked at the top. It is a broad subject, which I decided would be made more manageable by focusing on one family. I chose the prime minister’s family because I had heard conjecture about their business dealings for many years. People talked openly about the family’s wealth as if it was fact, but there was really no reporting on the subject that I could find that cited hard evidence backing up the claims. I kept scratching my head about why no one had tried to truth-squad the widespread rumors.
So I got started last year, and within a month or so, I was discovering intriguing things about some of the businesses, but each new discovery required digging deeper and deeper. I expected to finish the project within a month, by working weekends, but it took more than a year!
I have read the speculation that some “insider” gave me information, or that some enemies of the prime minister dropped off a huge box of documents at my office. That never happened. Not only were there no leaked documents, I never in the course of reporting met anyone who offered or hinted that they had documents related to the family holdings. This was a paper trail of publicly available documents that I followed with my own reporting, and if I might hazard a guess, it was a trail that no one else had followed before me.
In short, given the amount of effort this investigation required, I’d be stunned if there were a box of documents sitting somewhere that contained all of this work. If only it were so easy!
A great article with a lot of details. May I ask you how you can get into such detailed level of information? Did you get any leads from someone inside the Wall? It seems to me it is almost impossible to untangle such a network of secret dealings without any hint from the people in the know, and these are probably people who are Wen’s enemies. Thank you. — Jack, NY
My only real source for this lengthy article was a filing cabinet full of documents I requested from various Chinese government offices over a period of about a year. After having some luck with my initial requests for corporate registration documents from the State Administration for Industry and Commerce bureaus, I went on a reporting spree: requesting and paying fees for the records of dozens of investment partnerships tied to the relatives of Wen Jiabao.
I also began making lists of individuals and companies and trying to figure out who the people were and what their relationships were to one another; and what, I asked, was the purpose of all these partnerships — many of which had similar shareholders lists.
Although S.A.I.C. records are open to the public, few journalists in China have really made good use of them. They are invaluable sources of information about private companies. Two excellent Chinese publications, Caixin and the 21 Century Business Herald, have regularly used S.A.I.C. records. These two publications have done some groundbreaking business reporting here. But government restrictions on writing about the families of senior leaders limits the scope of investigative journalism in China, particularly when the families of high-ranking officials are involved.
So, Jack, there was no person “inside the Wall” helping me. I read the documents, called lawyers, accountants and financial experts for advice about how to make sense of the records. Occasionally I met someone who was able to identify one of the shareholders. But I told very few people that I was working on a story about the prime minister’s relatives. Even my closest friends did not know. I knew talking about my research could be risky, and might derail the project.