Number one blog for finding anything that has to do with the law. Read up on the law and know your rights. Labor Laws, Wage Laws, Contract Laws, and anything else that has to deal with justice and rights.
Sunday, December 8, 2013
Friday, October 4, 2013
Bits Blog: The Numbers Behind Twitter
Tuesday, September 10, 2013
Fair Game: Find the Loan Behind the Loans
Monday, September 2, 2013
A Data Broker Offers a Peek Behind the Curtain
Monday, August 5, 2013
Sunday, June 23, 2013
Understand the Truth Behind Your Expert's Statistics
Sunday, June 9, 2013
Bits Blog: The New Economics Behind the Oracle-Dell Partnership
Kimihiro Hoshino/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images This week, Dell and Oracle announced a partnership unique to both companies. Dell would offer Oracle software on its machines and would resell Oracle services. Much head-scratching ensued among industry analysts, largely over misunderstandings about where the industry was headed.
What bothered many of these analysts was the idea that both Dell and Oracle sell commodity servers based on Intel’s x86 reference designs. Oracle picked up that business when it acquired Sun Microsystems for $7.4 billion in 2010. Sun was never a big player in that business, however, having come to it late and grudgingly. It always preferred its own machines, which used the Sparc chip.
From the Sun deal, Oracle got many loyal (or locked-in) Sparc customers and insights to make the combined hardware and software “engineered systems” that advanced its in-memory data and analytics products. If it ever wanted to compete with Dell or Hewlett-Packard on commodity servers, it doesn’t want to now. In its third fiscal quarter, Oracle had hardware revenue of $671 million, down 23 percent. Much of that was faltering x86 sales.
What Oracle still wants, and Dell can offer, is exposure to smaller and midsize companies, which Oracle’s high-ticket sales force has trouble reaching.
“Oracle has a phenomenal engine into the top 500 enterprise accounts worldwide,” said Marius Haas, the head of Dell’s enterprise business. “They’d like to go after the broader market, and we’ve got a great relationship with companies there.”
There is also some bad blood behind this story: Mr. Haas worked at Hewlett-Packard when Mark Hurd was its chief executive. He left during Léo Apotheker’s brief tenure at the top of H.P., after Mr. Hurd’s resignation in August 2010.
So putting a little more pressure on H.P. probably sweetened the deal. Mr. Haas said this week’s announcement could lead to Dell selling even more Oracle products, both applications and databases. It appears to be the first time that Oracle has entrusted another company to sell its services. Even Oracle’s enemies like SAP and I.B.M. resell Oracle databases.
More important is what the deal says about selling hardware these days: Compared with even five years ago, companies are being forced to add more capabilities to their products.
It’s not just that Oracle is fusing high-performance hardware and software, or Dell is shipping servers preloaded with Oracle products.
At the bottom of the food chain, Taiwanese companies like Quanta and Delta, which used to make motherboards that go inside servers, now sell shrink-wrapped racks of servers for big data centers. No one there cares about the brand; they care about price. Even below any kind of systems level, Intel is increasing the capability of its chips and buying software companies.
Thanks to clouds, mobility, sensors and big networks, there is so much computing around now that it has changed everyone’s economics. For a while, that creates new alliances and tensions.
Monday, May 27, 2013
Third Circuit Keeps Ciavarella Behind Bars With Ruling
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Disruptions: Even the Tech Elites Leave Gadgets Behind
Nick Bilton/The New York Times The writer’s dinner guests place their smartphones in a stack in the middle of the table.If you were to meet 32-year-old Robin Sloan of San Francisco, you might think him a Luddite unable to get his head around new technologies. He owns an old Nokia phone with one main application: making phone calls. He takes notes using a pen and paper notepad. And he reads books printed on paper.
But Mr. Sloan is far from a Luddite. He used to work at Twitter as a media manager, teaching news outlets to use the hottest social media tools. Before that he was with Current TV as an online strategist, inventing the future of digital journalism.
Yet last year, as he set out to write his first book, “Mr. Penumbra’s 24-Hour Bookstore,” he found his iPhone and other technologies were getting in the way of his productivity, so he simply got rid of them. “I found it was more important and more productive for me to be daydreaming and jotting down notes,” he said. “I needed my idle minutes to contribute to the story I was doing, not checking my e-mail, or checking tweets.”
Even in Silicon Valley, Mr. Sloan has company.
As every aspect of our daily lives has become hyperconnected, some people on the cutting edge of tech are trying their best to push it back a few feet. Keeping their phone in their pocket. Turning off their home Wi-Fi at night or on weekends. And reading books on paper, rather than pixels.
I’ve experienced this, too.
Two years ago, when the iPhone and iPad were spiking in popularity, when I dined with other technology bloggers and reporters we enthusiastically passed our phones around the table, showing off the latest app or funny YouTube clip.
Now, even as our gadgets can hold more apps and stream faster videos, when I’m at dinner with technologists we play a new game. Attendees happily place their smartphones in a stack in the middle of the table, and the first person who touches his or her phone before the meal is over has to pay the bill.
Some couples who work in tech seem to be trying to step back the most.
“At least once a month my wife and I jump in our car and drive until cell service drops off (yes, this is possible) and spend the weekend engaged with all things analog,” Evan Sharp, a founder of Pinterest, said — on e-mail. “We read, we walk all over the California hills, we cook, we meet people who don’t work in technology.”
Other couples have told me of a “no gadgets in the bedroom” rule. (Kindles are sometimes an exception.) Some say they leave their phones at home when they go for Sunday brunch. Rather than take a picture of their bacon and eggs to post to Instagram, they can now enjoy each other’s company, and do that strange thing called talking.
There could even be a business model in products that encourage us to step away from our gadgets.
Last Tuesday, Penguin Press published “The Pocket Scavenger,” a book both physical and digital that encourages readers to go on an unusual scavenger hunt, collecting random objects, drawing and smudging on the book’s pages, then documenting them later with a smartphone.
“We’re not going to get rid of technology,” said Keri Smith, the author. “I feel like we’ve lost touch with noticing smells and tactile sensations, and I’d just like to offer some kind of antidote to what’s out there.”
As for Mr. Sloan, who has since published his book, he said his break from technology was a resounding success. He still checks his e-mail, but not while he’s getting coffee with someone or going for a stroll.
Although he isn’t rushing off to buy the next iPhone, he said he wouldn’t rule it out. But he would use such a device differently than he did before downgrading his cellphone.
“It sounds silly because we all used to do this all the time, but after getting rid of my smartphone I am now so much more comfortable just leaving the house without any phone at all,” he said. “I feel like I kind of learned how to do that again, and I would do the same thing if I had a fancy new smartphone too.”
E-mail: bilton@nytimes.com
Tuesday, May 7, 2013
DealBook: Strategic Posturing Behind the Suit Against Corzine
Harry CampbellLouis J. Freeh, the bankruptcy trustee for the failed futures firm MF Global, filed a lawsuit aimed at pinning its collapse squarely on Jon S. Corzine, the former chief executive, and two of his top lieutenants. And unlike in many other suits, Mr. Freeh has not named other groups like a company’s directors.
The tale Mr. Freeh weaves in the complaint presents Mr. Corzine and the other defendants, Bradley I. Abelow, the former chief operating officer, and Henri J. Steenkamp, the former chief financial officer, as having failed to properly manage risk at MF Global while recklessly trading in European sovereign debt. It is a picture of a headlong rush into failure. Mr. Freeh asserts that the three defendants breached their fiduciary duties by allowing MF Global to take on excessive risks.

The core of the case is that the three men did not properly “develop the appropriate controls, procedures and systems needed to transform” MF Global into a full-service investment bank. Not only that, but Mr. Corzine took personal control of MF Global’s proprietary trading “without ensuring that the Company had sufficient controls and adequate liquidity to properly manage the risks inherent in such trading.”
Mr. Corzine’s representatives have vehemently denied the accusations, and question why Mr. Freeh is taking such actions while court-order mediation is still proceeding.
But regardless of the merits of the case, Mr. Freeh is clearly making a tactical move with his lawsuit. Among the questions that arise in any corporate failure is this important one: Where were the directors, who are ultimately responsible for oversight of the company? In Mr. Freeh’s version of events, it turns out they were quite active in approving the risk limits and other acts by Mr. Corzine. But they were not the primary wrongdoers in this tale, and are not named as defendants. This seems to be part of his legal strategy in this suit. He appears to feel he has a better chance at overcoming the legal hurdles to holding executives liable for business decisions than members of MF Global’s board.
Mr. Freeh’s complaint is noteworthy for adopting an all-in strategy against Mr. Corzine, Mr. Abelow and Mr. Steenkamp. Strategically, Mr. Freeh may be hoping the directors will turn on Mr. Corzine and blame him for being a pied piper who led them to approve policies that turned out to be disastrous for MF Global. In corporate litigation, it is always helpful to have someone inside the boardroom pointing the finger at a wrongdoer to help show that these were not just ordinary business decisions that turned out badly.
It may be that Mr. Freeh will settle a claim against the directors later. But by suing Mr. Corzine first, the directors should get the message that they are bit players at best in Mr. Freeh’s account.
In addition, it is much easier under the law to hold officers liable for misdeeds than it is in the case of directors. Under Delaware law, where MF Global was incorporated, corporate directors cannot be sued to recover monetary damages for anything except a breach of the duty of loyalty, which usually requires showing that they gained improper benefits from their actions. To establish that directors are liable for failing to oversee the company and its risk management practices, Mr. Freeh would have to prove that “the directors demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities” and acted in bad faith.
This is an extremely high standard to meet, and Delaware courts regularly dismiss such claims. In a shareholder derivative case involving claims that Citigroup’s board failed to properly oversee the bank’s risk management before the financial crisis, for example, a Delaware court refused to find the board liable despite the bank’s near collapse and subsequent government bailout. Indeed, the court stated that under Delaware law “[t]o impose oversight liability on directors for failure to monitor ‘excessive’ risk would involve courts in conducting hindsight evaluations of decisions at the heart of the business judgment of directors.” The case against the Citigroup directors was dismissed because the plaintiffs could not show that the directors had acted in bad faith, but instead may have merely failed in their risk monitoring.
Mr. Freeh is keenly aware that Delaware law presents an almost insurmountable barrier to any suit against the directors. The board certainly looks foolhardy in trusting Mr. Corzine to take the risks that he did, but proving that they acted in bad faith would be quite difficult.
In contrast, Delaware law does not afford corporate officers the same level of protection. That means Mr. Freeh can seek to recover for a breach of the duty of due care by showing gross negligence on the part of the leaders of MF Global.
That is still a high standard, requiring something akin to proving recklessness by Mr. Corzine. But unlike a suit against the directors, which would probably be dismissed quickly, this claim has a reasonable chance of surviving a motion to dismiss that would allow it to proceed toward a trial. A public airing of MF Global’s plunge into bankruptcy is probably the last thing Mr. Corzine wants, so the settlement value of the case is higher.
Mr. Corzine was very careful to state in his Congressional testimony that he acted in good faith and that his actions were based on advice provide by others for policies that were ultimately approved by the directors. He will offer the business judgment rule, a cornerstone of Delaware corporate law, to argue that these were merely bad business decisions, which cannot create liability. Even Mr. Freeh admits that the MF Global directors signed off on much of the conduct, giving Mr. Corzine some cover for his management of the firm.
While Mr. Freeh has an uphill battle to win the case, Mr. Corzine’s more immediate problem may be the high costs of a potential trial. Because MF Global is in bankruptcy, he cannot look to the company to indemnify him for any settlement or even pay his legal expenses, something normally provided to corporate officers sued for their actions.
Instead, Mr. Corzine must rely on MF Global’s insurance – and it had two pretty hefty policies. At the time of the bankruptcy, MF Global had a “directors and officers” liability policy for $225 million and an “errors and omissions” liability policy for $150 million. The judge in the bankruptcy case has already authorized Mr. Corzine and other employees to draw up to $30 million from the policy to pay for their legal fees.
But this cap has probably been exceeded by now, given the numerous Congressional hearings about MF Global’s collapse and the criminal and regulatory investigations of the firm. The question is whether the bankruptcy court will allow Mr. Corzine and the other defendants to continue to draw on the insurance to pay for their mounting legal costs or seek to preserve the policy for payments to MF Global’s customers and claims holders.
Mr. Corzine’s biggest concern is not that he may lose the case, but that the mounting legal fees will take a significant bite out of the fortune he amassed from his days at Goldman Sachs. Mr. Freeh is clearly aiming straight at Mr. Corzine, and is not the type of opponent who can be sent packing with a quick settlement.
Monday, May 6, 2013
Book Looks Behind the Scenes at Fox
Friday, April 26, 2013
Boom Times in Paraguay Leave Many Behind
Thursday, April 25, 2013
DealBook: Strategic Posturing Behind the Suit Against Corzine
Harry CampbellLouis J. Freeh, the bankruptcy trustee for the failed futures firm MF Global, filed a lawsuit aimed at pinning its collapse squarely on Jon S. Corzine, the former chief executive, and two of his top lieutenants. And unlike in many other suits, Mr. Freeh has not named other groups like a company’s directors.
The tale Mr. Freeh weaves in the complaint presents Mr. Corzine and the other defendants, Bradley I. Abelow, the former chief operating officer, and Henri J. Steenkamp, the former chief financial officer, as having failed to properly manage risk at MF Global while recklessly trading in European sovereign debt. It is a picture of a headlong rush into failure. Mr. Freeh asserts that the three defendants breached their fiduciary duties by allowing MF Global to take on excessive risks.

The core of the case is that the three men did not properly “develop the appropriate controls, procedures and systems needed to transform” MF Global into a full-service investment bank. Not only that, but Mr. Corzine took personal control of MF Global’s proprietary trading “without ensuring that the Company had sufficient controls and adequate liquidity to properly manage the risks inherent in such trading.”
Mr. Corzine’s representatives have vehemently denied the accusations, and question why Mr. Freeh is taking such actions while court-order mediation is still proceeding.
But regardless of the merits of the case, Mr. Freeh is clearly making a tactical move with his lawsuit. Among the questions that arise in any corporate failure is this important one: Where were the directors, who are ultimately responsible for oversight of the company? In Mr. Freeh’s version of events, it turns out they were quite active in approving the risk limits and other acts by Mr. Corzine. But they were not the primary wrongdoers in this tale, and are not named as defendants. This seems to be part of his legal strategy in this suit. He appears to feel he has a better chance at overcoming the legal hurdles to holding executives liable for business decisions than members of MF Global’s board.
Mr. Freeh’s complaint is noteworthy for adopting an all-in strategy against Mr. Corzine, Mr. Abelow and Mr. Steenkamp. Strategically, Mr. Freeh may be hoping the directors will turn on Mr. Corzine and blame him for being a pied piper who led them to approve policies that turned out to be disastrous for MF Global. In corporate litigation, it is always helpful to have someone inside the boardroom pointing the finger at a wrongdoer to help show that these were not just ordinary business decisions that turned out badly.
It may be that Mr. Freeh will settle a claim against the directors later. But by suing Mr. Corzine first, the directors should get the message that they are bit players at best in Mr. Freeh’s account.
In addition, it is much easier under the law to hold officers liable for misdeeds than it is in the case of directors. Under Delaware law, where MF Global was incorporated, corporate directors cannot be sued to recover monetary damages for anything except a breach of the duty of loyalty, which usually requires showing that they gained improper benefits from their actions. To establish that directors are liable for failing to oversee the company and its risk management practices, Mr. Freeh would have to prove that “the directors demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities” and acted in bad faith.
This is an extremely high standard to meet, and Delaware courts regularly dismiss such claims. In a shareholder derivative case involving claims that Citigroup’s board failed to properly oversee the bank’s risk management before the financial crisis, for example, a Delaware court refused to find the board liable despite the bank’s near collapse and subsequent government bailout. Indeed, the court stated that under Delaware law “[t]o impose oversight liability on directors for failure to monitor ‘excessive’ risk would involve courts in conducting hindsight evaluations of decisions at the heart of the business judgment of directors.” The case against the Citigroup directors was dismissed because the plaintiffs could not show that the directors had acted in bad faith, but instead may have merely failed in their risk monitoring.
Mr. Freeh is keenly aware that Delaware law presents an almost insurmountable barrier to any suit against the directors. The board certainly looks foolhardy in trusting Mr. Corzine to take the risks that he did, but proving that they acted in bad faith would be quite difficult.
In contrast, Delaware law does not afford corporate officers the same level of protection. That means Mr. Freeh can seek to recover for a breach of the duty of due care by showing gross negligence on the part of the leaders of MF Global.
That is still a high standard, requiring something akin to proving recklessness by Mr. Corzine. But unlike a suit against the directors, which would probably be dismissed quickly, this claim has a reasonable chance of surviving a motion to dismiss that would allow it to proceed toward a trial. A public airing of MF Global’s plunge into bankruptcy is probably the last thing Mr. Corzine wants, so the settlement value of the case is higher.
Mr. Corzine was very careful to state in his Congressional testimony that he acted in good faith and that his actions were based on advice provide by others for policies that were ultimately approved by the directors. He will offer the business judgment rule, a cornerstone of Delaware corporate law, to argue that these were merely bad business decisions, which cannot create liability. Even Mr. Freeh admits that the MF Global directors signed off on much of the conduct, giving Mr. Corzine some cover for his management of the firm.
While Mr. Freeh has an uphill battle to win the case, Mr. Corzine’s more immediate problem may be the high costs of a potential trial. Because MF Global is in bankruptcy, he cannot look to the company to indemnify him for any settlement or even pay his legal expenses, something normally provided to corporate officers sued for their actions.
Instead, Mr. Corzine must rely on MF Global’s insurance – and it had two pretty hefty policies. At the time of the bankruptcy, MF Global had a “directors and officers” liability policy for $225 million and an “errors and omissions” liability policy for $150 million. The judge in the bankruptcy case has already authorized Mr. Corzine and other employees to draw up to $30 million from the policy to pay for their legal fees.
But this cap has probably been exceeded by now, given the numerous Congressional hearings about MF Global’s collapse and the criminal and regulatory investigations of the firm. The question is whether the bankruptcy court will allow Mr. Corzine and the other defendants to continue to draw on the insurance to pay for their mounting legal costs or seek to preserve the policy for payments to MF Global’s customers and claims holders.
Mr. Corzine’s biggest concern is not that he may lose the case, but that the mounting legal fees will take a significant bite out of the fortune he amassed from his days at Goldman Sachs. Mr. Freeh is clearly aiming straight at Mr. Corzine, and is not the type of opponent who can be sent packing with a quick settlement.
DealBook: Comparing the Valuations Behind Amazon and Apple Shares
And people wonder why it’s hard to understand the stock market.
Take a consumer sitting at home buying stuff on Amazon.com with his iPhone. To him, Apple’s product is a clear leader in the market, while Amazon is the retailer he uses most. Amazon’s shares are up nearly 40 percent over the last 12 months, while Apple’s are down nearly 30 percent over the same period. So why have their stock prices diverged so much when both companies appear to be at the top of their game?
Growth is the most common answer you’ll hear. When a company convinces investors that its earnings can keep going up, an enthusiasm grows around the shares, and they tend to perform well. Wall Street analysts expect Amazon’s earnings next year to be 66 percent higher than the forecast for 2013. They project a 10 percent uptick for Apple.
But there’s another conversation you need to have.
It revolves around whether the market has already factored the hoped-for growth into the stock price. It is possible to pay too much for excellence.
There are all sorts of ways to gauge how much credibility investors ascribe to a company’s “growth story.” One is to look at what investors are paying now for a company’s free cash flows, or the hard dollars it takes in from profits (minus the spending it does on plant and equipment). The results are stark. Apple’s stock market value is nine times last year’s free cash flows. On this metric, Amazon is at over 300 times. Sane investors would never touch a stock with such a dear valuation unless they felt cash flows were going to soar in the future.
And this brings us to the part of investing that usually separates winners from losers: guessing whether companies will actually do what we expect them to.
Amazon’s believers don’t mind that it’s spending such huge amounts on setting up new operations for its retail and data businesses. At some point, hopefully in the not too distant future, that spending will fall as the expansion reaches its limits. In that case, Amazon will be churning out much bigger cash flows as it enjoys near unassailable dominance.
Sure, but how wondrous will those cash flows be? Amazon’s operations produced $4.2 billion of cash flows last year. Let’s generously assume 10 percent annual growth for them, which would take them to $5.1 billion by the end of 2014.
Let’s be kind again and assume that capital expenditures fall a lot, to, say, $1 billion a year, from last year’s $3.8 billion. Free cash flows in 2014 would therefore total $4.1 billion.
Now, remember, at this future point, Amazon’s growth in free cash flow will have slowed a lot. Investors will probably decide to attach a lower valuation to the company. Being generous, let’s assume they value those hypothetical 2014 free cash flows at 21 times, Google’s multiple today. That would give Amazon a market worth of about $86 billion. That’s 30 percent lower than today.
Of course, the stock market believes what it wants to believe. It may well decide to remain starry-eyed about Amazon and give it a much higher valuation for years to come. But Apple’s recent drubbing suggests even the strongest runs can end nastily.
Friday, December 7, 2012
Understand the Truth Behind Your Expert's Statistics
Sunday, November 4, 2012
Understand the Truth Behind Your Expert's Statistics
Friday, November 2, 2012
DealBook: Behind an Estimated $30 Trillion Drain on Banks, a Lot of Hypotheticals
Cliff Owen/Associated PressWarren E. Buffett, the chief of Berkshire Hathaway. In the face of new margin rules, the company said it won’t be entering any big new derivatives bets.Imagine a situation in which the world’s banks have to find as much as $30 trillion to comply with just one new regulation. That might be something of a stretch, given that the gross domestic product of the United States is only $15.8 trillion, and the world’s 10 largest banks hold only $25 trillion of assets.
Yet a banking industry group recently looked into a new rule and sketched out a possibility in which banks were forced to come up with as much as $30 trillion in cash.
The potential cash call is outlined in a letter the International Swaps and Derivatives Association sent in September to regulators. It is the latest eye-popping number that lobbying firms and banks have produced to support their view that many new regulations will be enormously expensive — and the big, scary numbers seem to be gaining traction.
Some of the concern may be warranted, especially in Europe, where certain stressed banks have had trouble borrowing regular amounts in the markets. But a deeper look at the industry association’s $30 trillion figure suggests that many of the worries might be overdone.
The gargantuan sum relates to the market for derivatives, which are financial contracts that banks and investors use to bet on interest rates, stock prices, creditworthiness of corporations and the like.
Derivatives played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis. The market for many contracts was opaque, which stoked panic when certain players started to falter.
Before the financial crisis, big participants like large Wall Street banks were often able to avoid following certain rules intended to make the market safer. One of those practices involves something called initial margin. This is the cash or easy-to-sell assets that parties have to set aside at the outset of a derivatives trade. If one side can’t pay up, the other side can make a claim on the initial margin.
Now, regulators want to tighten up the margin rules. To do so, they are introducing regulations aimed at pushing derivatives trades through entities called central clearinghouses. These organizations effectively agree to pay out if one side of the original trade cannot pay.
Because of that pledge, clearinghouses have to make sure they can pay out if one party defaults. One way they do this is to demand margin from the parties that trade through them.
But a large number of derivatives trades won’t necessarily go through clearinghouses, even after the overhaul is in place. Such trades will still be done directly between two financial firms.
Regulators have proposed rules that force firms to supply initial margin on these so-called bilateral trades, too. These rules, which won’t apply to pre-existing trades, may not come into effect until late 2013 in the United States.
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association and many others want to stop or water down those margin rules on bilateral trades. In its paper, the association argued against initial margin rules, saying they were “likely to lead to a significant liquidity drain on the market, estimated to be in the region of $15.7 trillion to $29.9 trillion.” In other words, it believes there is a possibility that the rule could cost $30 trillion.
So, how likely is such a drain? A clue can be found in the $14 trillion range in the association’s estimates.
Under its lower estimate, the industry group assumes that many banks calculate their derivatives exposures in an advantageous manner sanctioned by the proposed regulations. Specifically, the rules allow banks to offset certain trades with each other. This has the effect of reducing a bank’s overall derivatives exposure for the purposes of calculating margin.
The upshot: Less margin is needed. At one stage in its analysis, the derivatives association says using this approach might reduce by half the overall amount of derivatives in the calculation.
But why wouldn’t the reduction be far more than $14 trillion, or roughly 50 percent? After all, net exposure can be reduced quite sharply by using the offsetting method. For instance, a bank may have $50 billion on trades betting that stocks go up and $49 billion on trades betting stocks go down, leading to a $1 billion net exposure for the bank.
Steven Kennedy, a spokesman for the association, says it chose 50 percent based partly on its estimates of how many firms might have the required technology to carry out offsetting. In essence, the numbers involve a lot of hypothetical assumptions.
This weakness applies to other, lower-margin estimates from opponents of the new rules.
Last year, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, a federal bank regulator, estimated that initial margin rules could lead to a $2 trillion burden for banks, a smaller but still alarming figure. The number was cited in several letters and studies from lawyers and lobbyists arguing against the margin rule. The comptroller listed three factors that might lead to banks posting less than $2 trillion. But, the study added, “at present, we are unable to estimate the mitigating effects of these three factors.”
Bryan Hubbard, a spokesman for the comptroller, said the paper reflected the comptroller’s best analysis at the time. He added, “The O.C.C. is likely to update the analysis when a final rule is issued.”
Other opponents of initial margin rules have been similarly vague when gauging factors that might reduce the burden. JPMorgan Chase sent a letter last year to regulators criticizing the initial margin rule, saying it might need to collect $1.4 trillion from its trading partners if it did not use the offsetting approach. The letter did say an offsetting approach might “produce smaller initial margin amounts.” Still, it didn’t specify how much smaller.
The initial-margin rules may prompt some firms to stop doing bilateral derivatives trades. Some financial companies have even started down that path.
In the face of new margin rules, Berkshire Hathaway said this year that it would not be entering any big new derivatives bets. “We shun contracts of any type that could require the instant posting of collateral,” Warren E. Buffett, the company’s chief executive, wrote in its latest annual report.